

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Training Tomorrow's Strategic Leaders
Preservation and Military Education at Antietam National Battlefield**

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No.
0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-04-2003	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Training Tomorrow's Strategic Leaders Preservation and Military Education at Antietam National Battlefield Unclassified		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Snyder, Keith B. ; Author		5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks Carlisle, PA17013-5050		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS ,		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APUBLIC RELEASE				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.				
15. SUBJECT TERMS				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: a. REPORT Unclassified		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 44	19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Rife, Dave RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil
b. ABSTRACT Unclassified		19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number DSN		
				Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lt Col Keith B. Snyder

TITLE: Training Tomorrow's Strategic Leaders: Preservation and Military Education at Antietam National Battlefield

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 07 April 2003 PAGES: 44 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The strategic staff ride has been a mainstay of military education for 100 years. The Maryland Campaign of 1862 presents unique opportunities to examine leadership and strategic concepts through campaign analysis and on-site visits. This paper will examine the history of the campaign, the military's role in preserving the battlefields, the tradition of military staff rides, and provide suggestions for military education at Antietam National Battlefield.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Professors Brian Moore and Leonard Fullenkamp at the U.S.A.W.C. for their friendship and support in this project, the staff at Antietam National Battlefield, especially Superintendent John Howard and Park Ranger Brian Baracz, and most importantly my wife Cindy, who stalwartly supported my attendance at the Army War College.

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**TRAINING TOMORROW'S STRATEGIC LEADERS
PRESERVATION AND MILITARY EDUCATION AT ANTIETAM NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD**

Through a careful and objective study of the significant campaigns of the world, a professional officer acquires a knowledge of military experience which he himself could not otherwise accumulate.

—Dwight D. Eisenhower

INTRODUCTION

The Maryland Campaign of 1862, which culminated in the Battle of Antietam, was a major turning point in the American Civil War and in the history of this nation. Lasting for just fifteen days, the courage, sacrifice and eventual outcome of the campaign would forever burn into the American memory names like McClellan and Lee, places like “Bloody Lane” and the “Cornfield,” and principles such as emancipation and freedom. With over 23,000 casualties, the battle of Antietam was the bloodiest one-day battle in American history. When the guns finally fell silent on the campaign and the Confederate army crossed back into Virginia, General Robert E. Lee’s first major invasion into the North was over. Although a tactical draw on the field, with Lee’s army retreating, Abraham Lincoln saw an opportunity to change the course of the war. The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation had been on Lincoln’s desk since July. Now that the long hot summer of Union defeats had given way to an autumn with Union success, Lincoln signed the Proclamation just three days after Lee’s army splashed back across the Potomac River. Because of early efforts to save the battlefields of the Maryland Campaign, the historic terrain provides soldiers an exceptional opportunity to study the battles on the actual ground where the critical events occurred. This paper will provide an overview of the campaign; describe the preservation efforts that took place to make the battlefields available as open-air classrooms; examine the military’s use of the historic landscape; and make recommendations for future Staff Rides.

THE FALL OF 1862

The summer of 1862 witnessed a series of Confederate successes and an incredible change of fortunes led by General Robert E. Lee. When Lee took command of the Army of Northern Virginia on 1 June after the wounding of General Joseph E. Johnston, the Union Army of the Potomac, led by General George McClellan, was knocking on the door to Richmond.




FIGURE 1 - MAP OF EASTERN THEATER OF WAR IN 1862

The Union commander brought his enormous army down the Chesapeake Bay from Washington and attacked toward Richmond on the peninsula between the York and James Rivers. To deflect some of the pressure on Richmond, Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, hero of First Manassas, was sent to the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. In the valley, Jackson and his men threatened the Northern capital and using rapid marches, maneuver, deception and hard fighting, fought six battles while defeating three Union commands. Jackson's classic campaign immobilized another Union corps and kept reinforcements from joining McClellan. Jackson and his men rejoined Lee back on the Peninsula. The Southerners halted the Union advance and, in a series of battles known as the Seven Days, were able to drive McClellan back to Harrison's Landing by the first of July.

Disappointed and frustrated, President Lincoln ordered a consolidation of the Union armies in the Shenandoah Valley and western Virginia under a new commander. Major General John Pope was brought east to take command of the new Federal Army of Virginia. Initially, Pope's new army was to push south from Washington D.C. and act in concert with McClellan in a pincer movement on the Confederate capital. McClellan's inactivity and constant requests for reinforcements were finally too much for Lincoln who ordered his army north to reinforce Pope. McClellan who viewed Pope as his inferior saw this order to as a "slap in the face."⁴ Infighting, massive egos, and divided loyalties amongst the Union army generals would have a detrimental effect on their prosecution of the war effort.

Robert E. Lee did not hesitate and ordered Jackson and his "foot cavalry" north toward Pope. Portions of Jackson's and Pope's armies initially clashed at the battle of Cedar Mountain on 9 August where Jackson's 22,000 Confederates came dangerously close to defeat at the hands of an inferior but aggressive force of about 12,000 Federals. The two armies pulled back and eyed each other across the Rappahannock River. Lee, realizing that McClellan's men were leaving Harrison's Landing, moved north to join Jackson to strike again at Pope before he could be reinforced. The Confederate commander once again turned to his trusted Lieutenant and ordered Jackson on a march around Pope to cut off his lines of supply and communication with Washington. After a grueling two-day, 52-mile march, Jackson and his men destroyed the Union supply base at Manassas Junction and then moved back to familiar ground on the First Manassas battlefield. There Jackson remained hidden along an unfinished railroad bed until 28 August when he attacked a small force of Pope's men moving across his front, thus opening the Second Battle of Manassas. The two armies consolidated and fought fiercely all day on the 29th. Lee and the other half of the Southern army commanded by Major General James Longstreet arrived on the 30th smashed into the Union left flank, and drove Pope's hapless army back to

Washington D.C. With the Union army defeated and disorganized in the northern Capital, Lee and President Jefferson Davis faced the crucial decision of what to do next. Should they continue a defensive strategy and pull back, or take advantage of success and go on the offensive?

THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN

An examination of General Lee's letter to President Jefferson Davis written near Dranesville, Virginia on 3 September 1862 provides a great deal of clues as to Lee's decision to move the campaign north. He first states that it was the "most propitious time since the commencement of the war"² for his army to enter Maryland. According to the American Heritage Dictionary propitious means "presenting favorable circumstances." Why did Lee think that September of 1862 was the most favorable time to turn north? First, he states in his letter to Davis that the two Union armies [Pope's and McClellan's] are "weakened and demoralized"³ and that their new recruits are not yet organized. In other words, strike when the enemy army is at its weakest. Second, Lee turns north and not toward Washington D.C. because he has "no intention of attacking him in his fortifications."⁴ The Capital by the fall of 1862 was an extremely well fortified city with over 50 forts and 600 guns. Third, Lee felt that the area north and west provided a much greater potential for forage and provisions and that a move in that direction by his army could "menace their possession of the Shenandoah Valley, and, if found practicable, to cross into Maryland."⁵ Maryland, a slave holding border state, figured prominently into Lee's plans and was a fourth reason for invasion. Lee wrote to Davis, "If it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her an opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable."⁶ For the Southerners, this was an army of liberators, not invaders. When Lee's army crossed the Potomac he issued a proclamation to the citizens of Maryland that clearly reflects this point of view. After describing in detail the many wrongs imposed by the Federal government upon them, Lee declares that, "the people of the south have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you to again enjoy the inalienable rights of free men, and restore independence and sovereignty to your State." Lee tells Marylanders that his army "has come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining the rights of which you have been despoiled."⁷

A fifth advantage to moving north is to draw the Union army away from the Confederate Capital for "as long as the army of the enemy are employed on this frontier I have no fears for the safety of Richmond."⁸ Further clarification can be found in Lee's after action report where he repeats many of the campaign goals stated in his pre-campaign letter to President Davis. By

moving north the “war was thus transferred from the interior to the frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts made accessible to our army.”⁹ Looking at the calendar and the upcoming winter Lee did not want “to permit the season for active operations to pass without endeavoring to inflict further injury upon the enemy.”¹⁰ In both his letter to Davis and the after action report, Lee was extremely concerned about the condition of his army, but he still believed that it was “strong enough to detain the enemy upon the northern frontier until the approach of winter should render his advance into Virginia difficult, if not impracticable.”¹¹ So, once again Lee sees his move into Maryland as protecting Richmond. The goal of deliverance for Maryland is repeated by Lee who states that, “At the same time it was hoped that military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberties.”¹² The Confederate leadership was focusing on the eastern theater of operations in early September, but actions both west and farther east would play a role in the decision to move north.

In the western theater of the war Confederate General Braxton Bragg was moving his Army of the Tennessee north from Chattanooga, Tennessee and General Edmund Kirby Smith’s Army of Kentucky invaded its namesake state and by the 3 September occupied the state capital of Frankfort. The Southern armies were on the move north on a wide front while political and diplomatic pressure continued to build to the east, across the Atlantic in England and France. For the first year of the war these two nations had remained neutral. Southerners hoped that the power of the cotton trade, the South’s number one export, would influence the Europeans to support their drive for independence. However, a glut of cotton exports in the years leading up to the war relieved the pressure to act quickly. By the fall of 1862 the abundant cotton supplies were beginning to diminish. With the series of Confederate victories on the Peninsula and at Second Manassas, the British were considering mediation or possible recognition. In fact British Prime Minister Viscount Palmerston wrote to his Foreign Minister after learning of the Union defeat at Manassas, “that it seems not altogether unlikely that still greater disasters await them, and that even Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates. If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider whether in such a state of things England and France might not address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation?”¹³ Foreign Minister Lord John Russell, answered the Prime Minister, “I agree with you that the time is come for offering mediation to the United States Government with a view to the recognition of the Independence of the Confederates.”¹⁴ Russell went on to call for a full Cabinet meeting later in September to discuss the issue. If Great Britain recognized the Confederacy, France surely would follow, and the pressure on the

Lincoln administration would almost certainly lead to a divided Union. The future of the Nation would probably be decided upon the outcome of the Maryland Campaign.

For the Confederates, morale was high, but so was the number of soldiers straggling in the Army of Northern Virginia as they started moving across the Potomac River into Maryland on 4 September. Bands played *Maryland, My Maryland* as the army slowly crossed and as one cavalryman remembered, “There were few moments, perhaps, from the beginning to the close of the war, of excitement more intense, of exhilaration more delightful...”¹⁵ News reached Washington that Confederates were marching into Maryland. Lincoln had no choice but to reinstate General George McClellan who had an exceptional talent for organization and was loved by his men. Time would tell if this was just the type of soldier that was needed in this moment of crisis. After securing the Capital, the Union army of approximately 80,000 men moved northwest toward Frederick, Maryland where Lee’s Confederates were concentrating.

Lee was disappointed by the cool reception that his army received in Frederick. Western Maryland was primarily pro-Union territory. One local citizen looked on with aversion as he described the Southern soldiers as “the dirtiest men I ever saw, a most ragged, lean, and hungry set of wolves.”¹⁶ The men were dirty, but their weapons were spotless. Lee had an even greater dilemma than the condition of his soldiers and the attitude of local Marylanders. When Lee moved into Maryland he expected the 14,000 Federals who were garrisoned at Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg to withdraw, but Union General-in-Chief Henry Halleck ordered the Union troops to stay in the Shenandoah Valley. These soldiers blocked the Confederate lines of communication back into Virginia. The Confederate commander decided to divide his army into four parts. Three parts commanded by Stonewall Jackson would surround and capture Harpers Ferry while the fourth part moved towards Hagerstown. Lee was convinced the maneuver could be accomplished in three days when he issued Special Orders 191 on 9 September.

Harpers Ferry is located at the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers. Two mountains, Loudoun Heights to the south and Maryland Heights on the east, look down on the small town nestled on a small triangle of land. Jackson’s men were able to capture the dominant heights surrounding the town, but their long and difficult approach march took much longer than expected. Lee’s campaign was behind schedule and in one of the great intelligence coups in U.S. military history, a copy of Lee’s Special Order 191 was found outside Frederick by a Union soldier on 13 September. When the order was taken to McClellan he was heard to say, “Here is a paper with which if I cannot whip Bobbie Lee, I will be willing to go home....”¹⁷ The momentum of the campaign had shifted to McClellan, but true to his cautious nature, the Union commander did not rush to destroy Lee’s widely scattered army. The two armies would first meet on South



FIGURE 2 - MAP OF MARYLAND CAMPAIGN AREA

Mountain as the Union forces attempted to punch through the crucial mountain passes. On Sunday morning 14 September, men in blue and gray would clash at three passes – Turner's, Fox's and Crampton's. A concerted effort by McClellan would drive a wedge between Jackson's men surrounding the Harpers Ferry and Longstreet's men desperately trying to hold the mountain passes. The Rebel force of approximately 18,000 fought gallantly, but by sunset on the 14th McClellan's men would capture all three passes, driving Lee west toward Boonsboro. On a positive note for the Confederate commander, Jackson captured Harpers Ferry the next morning. Over 12,000 Union soldiers surrendered with their valuable stores of small arms and artillery. The Union commander of the garrison, Colonel Dixon Miles, was mortally wounded with

one of the last artillery rounds fired into the lower town. After the capture, Jackson left a Division led by Major General A. P. Hill to manage the surrender terms, while the rest of his soldiers rushed to join the remainder of the Army of Northern Virginia that was gathering near the small farming community of Sharpsburg.

General Robert E. Lee had decided to make a stand. He knew his opponent would give him time to consolidate his army, and he was right. The Southern position was strong on the west side of Antietam Creek, however the Potomac River was to his back, with only one ford available. In addition, Lee's 40,000 man army was still divided, and when it was finally united, it was still outnumbered two to one. On Tuesday the 16th, both armies gathered for the coming storm on opposite sides of Antietam Creek. McClellan spent the day "obtaining information as to the ground, rectifying the position of the troops, and perfecting the arrangements for the attack."¹⁸ His plan was "to make the main attack upon the enemy's left—at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more by assailing the enemy's right—and as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their center with any reserve I might then have on hand."¹⁹ To prepare for the flanking attacks, McClellan sent I Corps of 8,000 men commanded by Major General Joseph Hooker over the Upper Bridge and Ford on the Antietam and into position on the Confederate left flank. The 7,000 man XII Corps commanded by Major General Joseph K. F. Mansfield followed in trace. On the Union left, the powerful 12,000 man IX Corps commanded by Major General Ambrose Burnside would make the other flanking attack.

THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM

Wednesday, September 17th dawned cold, damp and foggy. The double envelopment planned for the Union army quickly broke down into a series of piecemeal attacks that tumbled like dominos from north to south across the pastoral countryside. Hooker attacked at first light, through the North Woods and into the Cornfield. This sanguinary field would change hands again and again as men from New York and Wisconsin fought in mortal battle with soldiers from Georgia and Louisiana. General Hooker was wounded and carried from the field writing that "every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as with a knife, and the slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in their ranks a few moments before. It was never my fortune to witness a more bloody, dismal battlefield."²⁰ Just as the Federals began to make headway, Confederate veterans under the command of Major General John Bell Hood counterattacked them in a skillful use of interior lines by Lee. Echoing Hooker's words, Hood described the action as "the most terrible clash of arms, by far, that has occurred during

the war.”²¹ It was Hood’s turn to be counterattacked as the XII Corps arrived to clear the Cornfield and add more names to the casualty list. General McClellan then sent the Union II Corps across the Antietam and into the action. The Second was the largest corps in the army commanded by the oldest general – sixty-five year old Edwin Sumner. Sumner’s three divisions became separated by time and complicated terrain as they attacked one at a time. Sumner led Sedgwick’s Division of 5,000 men into the West Woods and deep into Confederate lines before Lee once again shifted his troops, catching Sumner on his front and flank. Over 2,000 Union men were killed or wounded in just twenty minutes. In fact, almost half of the casualties on that terrible day would take place in and around the Cornfield in the first three hours of battle. The rest of Sumner’s command inadvertently turned south toward the center of the battlefield and a winding county farm lane.

Lee’s lines were thin but strong in the center as North Carolinians and Alabamians under the command of Major General D. H. Hill packed close to 2,000 men into the Sunken Road. As the action quieted on the northern end of the field, the battle shifted south as Sumner’s other two divisions attacked the Sunken Road with a fury. The two sides blasted away at each other at point blank range. As one northerner remembered, “the thundering of artillery, the roaring of bursting shells, the rolling of musketry, and humming of deadly fragments and bullets, and sometimes the yells of the rebels and our own cheers all seemed to fill the whole horizon and drive peace away forever.”²² The Southern line in the Sunken Road broke after two hours of desperation, but McClellan did not send in reinforcements, and the action in center of the field slowly diminished. A combined 5,000 casualties would forever change the name of the Sunken Road to Bloody Lane and once again the battle shifted farther south towards the Lower or Rohrback Bridge.

It was not until 10:00 a.m. that Major General Ambrose Burnside received the order to begin his attack toward the Lower Bridge and Lee’s right flank, as once again the Union army continued its pattern of disconnected, irresolute attacks. Lee’s men on the west side of the creek were terribly outnumbered, but once again they had the advantage of terrain. It required three hours and three advances for Burnside’s men to capture the bridge that would eventually bear his name. After taking the bridge, Burnside delayed again to resupply and reinforce his position in preparation for his final advance towards the town of Sharpsburg. If successful, there was the potential that Burnside could cut Lee off from the lone available ford across the Potomac. At 3:00, Burnside men pressed forward over the most difficult ground on the battlefield, eventually reaching the high ground just south of town, only to be counterattacked and driven back. The unit who made this final move on the field was A.P. Hill’s “Light Division”

which had marched seventeen miles from Harpers Ferry in eight hours, arriving just in time to save Lee's right flank and the line of retreat. As reporter Charles Coffin remembered, "Gradually, the thunder dies away, the flashes are fewer. The musketry ceases and silence comes on, broken only by an occasional volley, and single shots, like the last drops of a shower."²³

The day was finally over. Approximately 12,500 Union and 10,500 Confederates would be killed wounded or reported missing in eleven hours of carnage unmatched in American history. The next day the two armies nervously and quietly gathered their wounded and their dead. Late on the 18th and into the morning of the 19th, Robert E. Lee and his army slowly crossed back over the Potomac River. The Maryland Campaign of 1862 was over. Although the battle was tactically a draw on the field, overall the campaign was a strategic defeat for the South because it failed to achieve its objectives. With Lee's army back in Virginia, and Maryland and Pennsylvania safe, Abraham Lincoln saw an opportunity to make a statement on the question of slavery. Lincoln had written to Horace Greeley on August 22, 1862 that, "My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that."²⁴ Lincoln would go on to say in the same letter, "I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men every where could be free."²⁵ In July, Lincoln had shown his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation to his Cabinet, but Secretary of State William Seward advised withholding it, "until you can give it to the country supported by military success." Otherwise the world might view it "as the last measure of an exhausted government...."²⁶ The Battle of Antietam and the Confederate retreat was enough of a "military success" for Lincoln to issue the Preliminary Emancipation on the 22 September. The Proclamation reflected Lincoln's new way of thinking about the conflict. Until this time, it was seen as a rebellion, a war to preserve the Union without dealing with the issue of slavery. Now Lincoln was conducting a fight to the finish with the additional objective of eradicating the institution of slavery, which would substantially undermine the economic and social structure of the South. Now the North was fighting for two reasons -- emancipation and Union. With emancipation clearly stated as a war aim, England and France, who had outlawed slavery years before, could not recognize the Confederacy. With a stroke of the pen, Lincoln wielded economic, diplomatic and military power while changing the course of the nation.

EARLY PRESERVATION EFFORTS

The earliest preservation efforts on the battlefield were a direct result of the carnage of 17 September. Approximately 4,000 soldiers were killed, and in the days that followed, many more died of wounds or disease. The peaceful village of Sharpsburg was turned into a huge hospital and burial ground extending for miles in all directions. Burial details performed their grisly task with speed, but not great care. Graves ranged from single burials to long, shallow trenches accommodating hundreds. Grave markings were somewhat haphazard, from stone piles to rough-hewn crosses and wooden headboards. A few ended up in area church cemeteries. In other cases, friends or relatives removed bodies from the area for transport home. By March of 1864, no effort had been made to find a suitable final resting place for those buried in the fields surrounding Sharpsburg. Many graves had become exposed; something had to be done.

In 1864, State Senator Lewis P. Firey introduced a plan in the Maryland Senate to establish a state, or national, cemetery for the men who died in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. On 23 March 1865, the state established a burial site by purchasing 11½ acres for \$1,161.75. The original Cemetery Commission's plan allowed for burial of soldiers from both sides. However, the rancor and bitterness over the recently completed conflict and the devastated South's inability to raise funds to join in such a venture persuaded Maryland to recant. Consequently, only Union dead were interred at Antietam. Confederate remains were reinterred in Washington Confederate Cemetery in Hagerstown, Maryland; Mt. Olivet Cemetery in Frederick, Maryland; and Elmwood Cemetery in Shepherdstown, West Virginia. Approximately 2,800 Southerners are buried in these three cemeteries, over 60% of whom are unknown.

Contributions totaling over \$70,000 were submitted from 18 Northern states to the administrators of the Antietam National Cemetery Board. With a workforce consisting primarily of honorably discharged soldiers, the cemetery was completed by September 1867. On 17 September 1867, on the fifth anniversary of the battle, the cemetery was ready for the dedication ceremonies. The ceremony was important enough to bring President Andrew Johnson and other dignitaries. President Johnson proclaimed, "When we look on yon battlefield, I think of the brave men who fell in the fierce struggle of battle, and who sleep silent in their graves. Yes, many of them sleep in silence and peace within this beautiful enclosure after the earnest conflict has ceased."²⁷

Between 1867 and 1890 other improvements were completed in the cemetery. The most dramatic of which was the installation of the central monument. The colossal structure of granite standing in the center of the cemetery reaches skyward 44 feet, 7 inches, weighs 250 tons, and

is made up of 27 pieces. The soldier, made of two pieces joined at the waist, depicts a Union infantryman standing "in place rest" facing homeward to the north. Designed by James G. Baterson of Hartford, CT, and sculpted by James Pollette of Westerly, RI, at a cost of over \$32,000, the "Private Soldier" first stood at the gateway of the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia, PA, in 1876. It was disassembled again for the long journey to Sharpsburg but was delayed for several months when the section from the waist up fell into the river at Washington, D.C. When retrieved, it was transported on the C&O Canal, and dragged by using huge, wooden rollers through Sharpsburg to the cemetery. On 17 September 1880, the statue was finally in place and was formally dedicated. The inscription on the monument is an evocative message for soldiers of all time – "Not for themselves but for their country."

When the veterans of Antietam aged into their 50s and 60s, a movement began to preserve more than just the cemeteries of their fallen comrades. With graying hair and increased political and financial power, the veterans turned their eyes to the fields where they had fought. In the late 19th Century "many citizens were still living whose grandfathers and even fathers had fought during the Revolution, and tens of millions were living who had experienced, directly or indirectly, the tragic fighting of the Civil War. The great issues of those wars were part of their lives and to them preserving and marking the major battlefields was a national obligation."²⁸ Many of the Revolutionary and Civil War battlefields were fought in wild, undeveloped parts of the county. One component of the early preservation movement was a desire to just mark important locations before they were lost or forgotten. Another factor increasing the momentum to do something was driven home when the old veterans began to meet and hold reunions, where else but on the old battlefields. These encampments began and grew during the period commemorating the 25th anniversary of the War. As the veterans of blue and gray met on the very fields where they had fought a generation before, they, with the help of others, took up the task of preserving and marking the major battlefields. Between 1890 and 1899, Congress passed legislation to authorize the establishment of four national military parks. The first four battlefields were Chickamauga and Chattanooga (1890), Shiloh (1894) Gettysburg (1895), and Vicksburg (1899).²⁹ Ironically, the legislation to commemorate Antietam was passed in 1890, but it was not selected to be a full-fledged national military park. However Antietam, like the other battlefields, would be funded and managed by the War Department. A growing controversy at the new Gettysburg National Military Park would establish the foundation for historic preservation that is still with us today.

In Pennsylvania, the Gettysburg Electric Railway Company had begun constructing an electric trolley deep into the heart of the battlefield. This raised great concern among the newly

formed Gettysburg National Park Commission. Secretary of War Daniel Lamont took the case to Congress, which passed a joint resolution to direct Secretary Lamont to acquire the threatened land by purchase or condemnation. The Government moved to condemn and they were counter sued by the railroad company. The case went all the way to the Supreme Court. A unanimous decision was rendered in favor of condemnation in 1896. The decision read in part that,

The importance of the issue involved in the contest of which this great battle was a part cannot be overestimated. The existence of the government itself, and the perpetuity of our institutions depended upon the result...Can it be that the government is without power to preserve the land, and properly mark out the various sites upon which this struggle took place? Can it not erect the monuments provided for by these acts of Congress, or even take possession of the field of battle, in the name and for the benefit of all the citizens of the county, for the present and for the future? Such a use seems necessary not only a public use, but one so closely connected with the welfare of the republic itself as to be within the powers granted Congress by the constitution for the purpose of protecting and preserving the whole country.³⁰

This controversy, and the resulting decision, established the principle that the preservation of nationally important historic sites is a legitimate purpose of the Government of the United States. The Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of our Federal system were now all in line concerning the preservation and expansion of the battlefield parks.

It is important to note that the legislation to create the first national military park, Chickamauga and Chattanooga, stated that the purpose of the park is "preserving and suitably marking for historical and professional military study the fields of some of the most remarkable maneuvers and most brilliant fighting in the war of the rebellion."³¹ When the Civil War battlefields were being acquired and marked, it was considered "highly desirable to study, document, map, and mark every troop position in unmistakable detail on the ground itself."³² If done correctly and accurately, the battlefields would serve the needs of professional soldiers and historians to whom it was "vital to study the strategy and tactics of the great campaigns and battles in detail on the ground."³³ At both Gettysburg and Chickamauga/Chattanooga, the federal government would acquire large tracts of land. This would not happen at Antietam.

At Antietam an Act of Congress dated 30 August 1890, authorized \$15,000 for the "purpose of surveying, locating, and preserving the lines of battle of the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia, and for marking the same . . . and all lands acquired by the United States for this purpose, whether by purchase, gift, or otherwise, shall be under the care and supervision of the Secretary of War."³⁴ Like the other battlefield parks, a commission was

established to oversee the work. The Antietam Battlefield Board originally consisted of two members, Colonel John C. Stearns of Vermont, Union army veteran and General Henry Heth of Virginia, a Confederate veteran. These two old soldiers set in motion the creation of what is now Antietam National Battlefield. During the first four years of the Battlefield Board, Congress appropriated just over \$46,000 of which about half was spent on salaries, research and printing of maps, and 232 temporary wooden troop position markers.³⁵ These early efforts were centered on Antietam and did not include other areas of the Maryland Campaign such as Harpers Ferry and South Mountain.

Brigadier General Ezra Carman, a veteran of the battle from New Jersey was added as a "historical expert," replacing Colonel Stearns and West Point graduate, Major George B. Davis, was added as the new President of the Board.³⁶ Along with General Heth, these three men would have great influence on the establishment of Antietam Battlefield. Major Davis however had a particular impact on preservation of this and other fields. Davis testified to Congress that the way to preserve the battlefield was to perpetuate the agricultural nature of the community. He ensured that no large tracts of land be bought at Antietam and that only narrow avenues (rights of way) be purchased, keeping the farmland intact. This less costly method of preservation became known as the "Antietam Plan."³⁷ Looking at the possible increase in the number Civil War parks, and the associated costs of purchasing land, the Secretary of War wrote to Congress, "It is earnestly recommended that Congress authorize the marking of remaining important battlefields in a manner adopted at Antietam, which can be completed in a few years at a moderate cost, while the project of more national military parks, of thousands of acres bought by the government, involves the expenditure of millions of dollars and an indefinite lapse of time before completion."³⁸ Sadly for today's conservation efforts around the county, the Antietam Plan was chosen at many battlefields as the model for preservation. The historians at the turn of the 20th century could not have foreseen the population and development explosion that threatens so many battlefield parks at the beginning of this century. After serving for only a year, Major George B. Davis was replaced on the Board by Major George W. Davis. Both of these officers would eventually be promoted to Brigadier General. After serving for four years on the Antietam Board, George W. Davis would go on to serve as the assistant engineer completing the Washington Monument, an engineer on the Panama Canal, and Governor of the Panama Canal Zone. During the next five years the Antietam Battlefield Board completed their work. Highlights include:

- Manufacture and installation of 408 cast iron tablets that define and explain the movements of both armies. This project was expanded to include the entire Maryland Campaign with tablets at Harpers Ferry, South Mountain, Cramptons Gap and Shepherdstown.
- Construction of five miles of tour roads that connected to the existing public roads. Major Davis explained that these roads “make the entire field accessible and, at the same time, enable the principal lines of battle to be so marked as to convey a clear idea of the several phases of the engagement.”³⁹ Included in this new road network was an improvement of the road from the Sharpsburg railway station to the National Cemetery.
- Completion of the sixty-foot high limestone masonry observation tower. Located at the corner of the Sunken Road the tower provides an excellent view of the center of the battlefield and includes bronze plaques inscribed with directions and distances to key sites.
- Monuments were installed to mark the death or mortal wounding of six general officers, three from each army. Each monument consists of a 12-pound bronze cannon barrel mounted muzzle down in a block of stone.
- Eight artillery pieces were mounted on carriages of cast-iron and were placed at key artillery positions.
- Creation of battlefield troop movement maps that were eventually published by the U.S. Army Chief of Engineers in 1904. Researched by Ezra Carman and drawn by engineer Colonel E. B. Cope, the fourteen battlefield maps have proven to be one of the most valuable resources every created by the Battlefield Board and they are still used extensively by the current Battlefield staff.⁴⁰

Antietam National Battlefield today is essentially the same park that was created by the work of the Antietam Battlefield Board from 1890 and 1900. While there has been little visible change at the battlefield over the last 100 years, there have been two key developments: the transfer of the National Battlefields to the Department of the Interior and the purchase of large tracts of battlefield lands. These two developments will be covered in more detail, but first it is important to review another important event at the end of the 19th Century that would greatly enhance the development of Antietam National Battlefield and the use of the historic landscape by professional soldiers for military education.

Finally completed in 1901, publication of *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* had taken almost forty years at a cost of over three million dollars. They have been called the “single most valuable, most quoted, and most sought-after source of Civil War history” and “the most notable publication of its kind in America”⁴¹ President Lincoln signed the original legislation in May 1864 which required a compilation of all significant Union and military records. After the war, further legislation was passed to include Confederate records as well. Reconstruction and a lack of funds delayed the project until the 1880s when the Publications Office, War Records was created with a full-time staff. Then, like the Civil War parks, a three-man committee was established. Interestingly, the first two presidents of the Board of Publication were Majors George B. Davis and George W.

Davis, the same two officers who had served on the Antietam Battlefield Board. George B. served on the Publication Board for four years, the Antietam Board for a year, and then went on to become a Professor of Law at West Point.⁴² Known as the ORs (an abbreviation of Official Records), this 128-volume set with its accompanying atlas has been used for over 100 years as the primary source for Civil War research. An example of the quality and depth of these volumes can be seen in an examination of the sources for the Maryland Campaign. Contained in Series 1, Volume 19, the Maryland Campaign includes 899 pages, a summary of key events, organizational charts of both armies, and over 300 after action reports of Union and Confederate officers.

At the beginning of the 20th Century the reports and documents of the Union and Confederate, Army and Navy commanders were gathered, organized and published. Many of the great fields of battle in America's Civil War were being preserved and marked. Just as the waters of the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers join at Harpers Ferry, the confluence of documentation and preservation set the stage for the use of Civil War battlefields as a place of study and reflection that is best embodied in the form of the military Staff Ride.

EARLY CAMPAIGN STAFF RIDES

Unlike professionals in other fields, the professional soldier cannot in reality routinely practice his craft, nor would he want to. However, the military leader must always be fully trained and tactically, operationally, and strategically sound the moment war begins. That has always been the dilemma for soldiers – how does one learn about and prepare for war without personal involvement and experience. One method is to study the great campaigns and leaders of the past. Carefully woven into training, military history can go far to provide a vicarious experience of war that is helpful in improving the professional education of soldiers. As former Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono described, "History sharpens the vision of the skilled commander. By taking in the events and lessons of the past, he can assess his present readiness for war and prepare himself and his subordinates for the challenges of future battles."⁴³ Studying battles and leaders within the pages of books, or spread across two-dimensional maps is an excellent start. However, the best way to understand the decisions, actions, mistakes and victories of leaders past is to stand on the ground where the events took place. Only there can the true student explore and analyze significant actions within the context of the actual terrain in three dimensions. For military leaders it is not enough to just take a historical tour that relates what happened, they must dig deeper into how and why, and try to

gain insights and make connections with today's military environment. The battlefield Staff Ride is the vehicle to gain this higher understanding.

In the definitive book on the staff ride, William G. Robertson states, "Carefully designed and intelligently executed, a staff ride is one of the most powerful instruments available for the professional development of U.S. Army leaders."⁴⁴ In the forward to Robertson's book, former Chief of Staff of the Army General John Wickham, Jr., wrote that "Staff rides represent a unique and persuasive method of conveying the lesson of the past to the present-day Army leadership ... Properly conducted, these exercises bring to life, on the very terrain where historic encounters took place, examples, applicable today as in the past, of leadership tactics and strategy, communications, use of terrain, and, above all, the psychology of men in battle."⁴⁵ The military Staff Ride has long been a part of the training experience for professional soldiers. It was on the great battlefields of the American Civil War where the idea for outdoor, battlefield education began. "In the 1880s, the War Department had begun to take measures to preserve many of the greatest battlefields of the Civil War. Senior Army leaders planned from the start to use sacred grounds like Antietam not just as shrines to American valor and patriotism but also as open-air classrooms for the education of officers in the U.S. Army and National Guard."⁴⁶

Elihu Root, who was Secretary of War from August 1899 to January 1904, led many reforms that changed the entire fabric of the U.S. Army from a largely frontier-based, Indian-fighting force to a more modern force that would help win WWI. Secretary Root emphasized military education and was the founder of the Army War College in 1903. He reorganized the militia into the National Guard and passed General Staff Act of February 1903. The Staff Act obligated the General Staff Corps to perform duties involving "the preparation of plans and campaigns, of reports of campaigns, battles, engagements, and expeditions, and of technical histories of the military history of the United States."⁴⁷ The Staff Act also influenced the new War College's use of the battlefields for Staff Rides. Retired Brigadier General Harold Nelson, former Army Chief of History is a co-author with Dr. Jay Luvaas of numerous War College Guides for Battlefield Staff Rides. In a recent lecture at the Military History Institute, he stated that, "Since the War College supplied the officers who were professionally credentialed to serve on the General Staff, and since the General Staff needed to be attuned to a broad range of political questions concerning the National Military Parks, it made sense to actually visit at least one of the Army's parks."⁴⁸ Secretary Root's influence was also felt at the U.S. Military Academy. The Superintendent's report of 1902 stated:

...a notable change is one initiated by the Secretary of War, which supplements the instruction the first class receives in the operations of war by permitting it to visit one of the great battlefields of the Civil War. In April 1902, the first class, after a previous study of the Gettysburg campaign, spent two days in practical study on that battlefield, with much resulting good.... The practice of supplementing the theoretical and historical study of the art of war by a practical study of its principles on one of our famous battlefields is of such incalculable importance in the training of our young officers that I trust it is permanently incorporated in the Military Academy's curriculum.⁴⁹

Other early Staff Ride leaders in the American military were Colonel Arthur Wagner and Major Eben Swift. These two officers were on the staff at the Infantry and Cavalry School at Leavenworth, Kansas. They believed "that the road to an understanding of military science began with the study of military history."⁵⁰ Through their leadership, the Staff Ride became an integral part of the curriculum. When Major Swift was assigned to the Army War College, which was then located in Washington, D.C., he instituted the Historical Staff Ride as part of the War College training. In the beginning, students made day trips from the Capital. But starting in 1909, in the final month of the curriculum, the entire War College would travel for a month riding horseback over the battlefields of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Grant's 1864 Overland Campaign and the Shenandoah Valley. Gettysburg and Antietam were added later, making the month-long trip close to 600 miles.⁵¹ Brigadier General William A. Stofft, Chief of Military History, said in 1986, "Around the turn of the century, the U.S. Army took the lead for the federal government in preserving and marking Civil War battlefields, primarily so that those fields could be used as outdoor classrooms for the education of officers. When the U.S. Army War College was founded about the same time, its faculty and students benefited from the results by taking extensive Staff Rides over the old battlefields."⁵² One early War College student, Major John A. Lejeune recalled how the battlefield lessons were "of immense value to us professionally," and Major General Hunter Liggett who was the President of the College in 1910 stated that "no officer who took these staff rides failed to appreciate their immense advantages..."⁵³

One early training method used by the War College at Antietam was to divide the class into two groups, and using generic names to focus the discussion on principles rather than



Courtesy of Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks

FIGURE 3 -1907 ARMY WAR COLLEGE STAFF RIDE AT ANTIETAM

specifics, they would examine the movements of the “Red” and “Blue” armies as they marched through Virginia and Maryland. Using the events of the Maryland Campaign as a guide, the instructors sometimes injected variations on the campaign to force the students to think through problems of maneuver and supply, based on terrain and their training rather than reciting historic events. Students were often asked to prepare the written orders to concentrate the scattered parts of the Red army at Sharpsburg, or move the Blue army from Washington to Frederick. When one group in 1907 arrived at Antietam they were required to write the orders to bring each Corps of the Blue army onto the battlefield as the Army of the Potomac had done using McClellan’s intent expressed in his after action report.⁵⁴ Other assignments included an examination and a simulated establishment of logistical support for the Army of the Potomac using trains, depots and roads. One class was required to determine a division level communications plan. However, the most important part the training involved critiquing the

decisions made by Union and Confederate commanders on the field where their decisions were made, and trying to scrutinize them with the information that was available to the officer at the time.

With the onset of WWI there was a hiatus in Staff Ride training. After the “war to end all wars,” the U.S. Marines starting using the Civil War battlefields for training and for publicity. Army War College graduate General John A. Lejeune, who has been called “the greatest of all Leathernecks,” led them. He was the Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, prior to his appointment as Major General, Commandant of the Marine Corps.⁵⁵ Major General Smedley Butler, one of the few Americans who have been awarded two Congressional Medals of Honor, joined General Lejeune. Recognizing the proximity of many Civil War battle sites the Marine Corps began to use them for maneuvers and exercises using modern weapons and tactics. The public would be invited as the Marines who were stationed at Quantico Marine Base in Virginia staged battle reenactments.⁵⁶ In 1921, five Regiments of Marines marched to the Wilderness Battlefield in the largest field exercise since WWI with President Warren Harding in attendance. The next year they traveled to Gettysburg and in 1923 they concentrated their efforts in the Shenandoah Valley. It was at Antietam in 1924 the Marines held their last of this series of maneuvers and reenactments. They marched from Quantico on August 24th and stopped in Frederick, Maryland for three days of liberty. After arriving at Sharpsburg the Marines conducted training exercises that concluded with a re-enactment on September 12th before a crowd of 40,000 spectators!⁵⁷

The War College also returned again to the Civil War battlefields in 1920, this time riding in motorized vehicles instead of on horseback. Funds were short so the school just visited the Virginia sites, however the 1921 tour was conducted in 28 Cadillac touring cars.⁵⁸ It is not surprising that given the recent WWI experience the classes focused on the trenches and earthworks in Virginia. The practice at the War College waxed and waned during the interwar period. A Staff Ride during this era involved each student being assigned a particular phase of the campaign or battle and they would be responsible for research and preparation for a briefing to their classmates at the appropriate stop. Students would work in pairs – one taking the Union side, the other the Confederate. WWII caused another hiatus in the Staff Ride Program. In 1951 the Army War College moved to Carlisle Barracks, where the entire class would make an annual pilgrimage to nearby Gettysburg, a tradition that still endures.⁵⁹

Courtesy of National Park Service, Antietam National Battlefield



FIGURE 4 - WAR COLLEGE STAFF RIDE AT THE CORNFIELD IN 1937

The interwar period also saw major changes in the long-term preservation and management of Antietam and the other Civil War parks, and once again the War College played

a role. During the 1920s, a time of peace and prosperity, numerous bills were introduced into Congress to establish more battlefield parks at sites such as Fredericksburg and Petersburg. With so many bills being introduced, the Committee on Military Affairs needed a comprehensive study before they would take action. President Calvin Coolidge signed H.R. 11613 on June 11, 1926, which directed the Secretary of War to complete a broad historic sites survey. The House committee that passed the legislation based a great deal of the language on a report prepared by Lieutenant Colonel C.A. Bach, Chief, Historical Section, Army War College and signed by the Secretary of War in 1925.⁶⁰ Bach's memorandum reviewed Congress' past actions that shaped battlefield preservation policy, set forth a comprehensive system for classifying battles according to their importance, and proposed preservation action corresponding to the classification system. It also stated that the National Military Parks should be "so marked and improved as to make them real parks available for detailed study by military authorities, the battle lines and operations being clearly indicated on the ground."⁶¹ Bach's report was broader than just the Civil War. It also included the Revolutionary War, War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Indian Wars.⁶² The Act created a classification system for evaluating the importance and priority of battlefields. Once again a three-man commission was established with representatives from the Quartermaster General, Chief of Engineers and the historical section of the Army War College. Their job was to evaluate and rank, survey, and produce historical studies of proposed battlefield sites. This work was crucial because "no real estate shall be purchased for military park purposes by the Government unless report thereon shall have been made by the Secretary of War."⁶³ For four years the historical section of the War College diligently conducted a national battlefield survey. With the data provided by the Secretary of War, Congress added fourteen battlefield sites and National Military Parks from 1926 to 1931.

On August 10, 1933 President Franklin Roosevelt signed legislation that transferred all of the National Military Parks, battlefield sites, national monuments and national cemeteries to the new National Park Service (NPS).⁶⁴ The NPS was established in 1916 as part of the Department of Interior to; "promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reservations...which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."⁶⁵ The transfer was primarily a move to consolidate administration of the battlefields and their historic preservation under one agency. The battlefields would now be part of a larger vision of national heritage, managed by the National Park Service for the benefit and inspiration of all the people of the United States.

Since the transfer to the National Park Service, the battlefield parks have grown in number and size. Currently there are seventeen battlefield parks, six forts and many related additional historic sites like Springfield Armory, Andersonville and Appomattox. There has also been legislation crucial to Antietam and the long-term preservation and use of Maryland Campaign sites. Harpers Ferry National Historic Park became part of the National Park System in 1944. It now covers over 2,300 acres in the states of West Virginia, Maryland, and Virginia.⁶⁶ In 2002, the state of Maryland passed legislation to create South Mountain Battlefield Park. With the additional preserved lands at Harpers Ferry and South Mountain a more complete campaign study is now possible. The two most crucial legislative actions at Antietam Battlefield took place in 1960 and 1988. The 1960 legislation authorized the Secretary of the Interior to "acquire such lands and interests in land ...necessary to preserve, protect and improve the Antietam National Battlefield...to assure the public a full and unimpeded view thereof...in, or its restoration to, substantially the condition in which it was at the time of the battle of Antietam."⁶⁷ Preserving the historic landscape as close as possible to 1862 was the good news of the 1960 legislation. However, bad news for the long term was also included when the act further stated, "Not more than 600 acres of land" shall be acquired.⁶⁸ H.R. 4554, passed on October 25, 1988 corrected this dilemma by eliminating the government ownership restriction of 600 acres. Since then numerous purchases by the government and private organizations have increased the battlefield property to 2,749 acres in Federal ownership and protective easements out of 3,255 acres in the authorized boundary. For over one hundred years the War Department and the National Park Service have preserved, documented and expanded the national battlefield park idea, creating incredible opportunities for today's historical Staff Rides of the Maryland and other great campaigns of the Civil War.

CURRENT CAMPAIGN STAFF RIDES

In recent years numerous military schools and organizations have adopted and continued the Staff Ride tradition. Recent groups to visit Antietam Battlefield include the U.S. Naval Academy, West Point Cadets, ROTC groups, soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines from a variety of active duty and Reserve Component units, the Secretary of the Army, the German Minister of Defense, Senior Service Schools and numerous foreign military groups. In addition, civilians at the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Department of State have toured the battlefield. For the U.S. Army it was Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono and Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr. who reestablished and emphasized the importance of the Staff Ride in the late 1980s. They saw the training as a "powerful teaching tool that can

contribute to leader training at any level" that "uses military history with the actual battlefield to bring together the realities of war.⁶⁹ Obviously, the battlefield Staff Ride has a long tradition with prominent military leaders advocating its use. What are the current definitions and key elements of this unique category of training? Once again, Dr. William Robertson provides an excellent definition:

A staff ride consists of systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated with that campaign and an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from each. It envisions maximum student involvement before arrival at the site to guarantee thought, analysis, and discussion. A staff ride thus links a historical event, systematic preliminary study, and actual terrain to produce battle analysis in three dimensions. It consists of three distinct phases: preliminary study, field study, and integration.⁷⁰

There are numerous topics or themes that are fundamental to a successful staff ride. The following are some primary battlefield themes in no particular order. The order and emphasis of these themes are dependent on the nature of the group:

- The gap between battle plans and execution. There are always opportunities on a battlefield to illustrate the fog and friction of war. Battles are dynamic, interactive tests of will that rarely go as planned. Antietam provides numerous opportunities to illustrate this from Lee's campaign plan to the movement of the Union Second Corps.
- Leadership. This should be discussed at all levels at every opportunity to show how a leader's actions contribute to the outcome of battles and campaigns. The lack of leadership should also be closely examined such as Dixon Miles's decision making at Harpers Ferry. For senior leaders, looking into the mind of the army commander at the campaign level, described as generalship, can be particularly effective.
- Initiative and courage. This can be illustrated on the individual and unit level. Staff ride participants should examine how these factors were, or were not, central to achieving a favorable outcome.
- The role of training and discipline. The ability of units to withstand the challenges of combat is timeless. The artillery drill is an excellent example that can be done at many of Antietam's critical artillery locations such as Col S.D. Lee's Battalion across from the Dunker Church or Battery B, 4th U.S. Artillery's position at the Cornfield.
- The principles of war. For some officers the nine principles of war are just a memorized list in a book. Historic battlefields are replete with examples to validate the principles and

make them real. This could, and should be the central theme of any battlefield staff ride. McClellan's inability to utilize mass in his attacks and Lee's use of maneuver and unity of command are obvious examples of training opportunities at Antietam.

- The human dimension of war. A soldier's physical and emotional reactions to the demands of combat are also a timeless aspect of war that all members of the military should try to understand and appreciate. Historians can find and use a wealth of primary source materials such as letters, diaries and reports.
- Terrain. The impact of terrain on the planning and execution of military campaigns and battles is a keystone to spending time, resources and efforts on visiting battlefields. "Stonewall" Jackson's use of the heights surrounding Harpers Ferry to effect its capture, and Lee's defensive use of Antietam Creek are just two of many examples in the Maryland Campaign.
- Combined arms. Historic campaigns provide an opportunity for case studies in combined arms or single arms and the relationship between weapons, tactics and doctrine. The staff ride leader must be familiar with historic weapons characteristics such as ranges, weight, accuracy, and rate of fire. Many current military specialties such as artillery, signal corps and medical aspects lend themselves to a concentration on this theme.
- Logistics. A comprehensive study of a commander's ability to sustain combat operations is often what separates a historical tour from a battlefield staff ride. Clearing and maintaining lines of supply had a major impact on both Lee and McClellan in the Maryland Campaign.

MARYLAND CAMPAIGN STAFF RIDE SURVEY

The Maryland Campaign and the Battle of Antietam provide exceptional opportunities for military education. As part of the research for this project, a survey was sent to eleven professional historians who have led hundreds of staff rides on the campaign. The results of this survey provide the military professional with recommendations to improve any future battlefield staff rides of the Maryland Campaign. First, the recommended stops are:

1. South Mountain: If possible, all three gaps. However it should be noted that Fox's Gap has extremely limited parking.
2. Harpers Ferry: Bolivar Heights
3. Antietam:
 - a. Lee's Headquarters

- b. McClellan's Headquarters at the Pry House
 - c. North Woods (park tour stop 2)
 - d. East Woods (park tour stop 3)
 - e. Cornfield (park tour stop 4)
 - f. West Woods (park tour stop 5)
 - g. Bloody Lane (park tour stop 8)
 - h. Burnside Bridge (park tour stop 9)
 - i. National Cemetery (park tour stop 11)
4. Shepherdstown: Botelers Ford if time permits.

When asked at what level of war the education should be focused, the primary answer was at the operational level of war. However there are opportunities to teach strategic and tactical lessons. There were many more diverse answers to my question on what was the essence of a battlefield staff ride. General Harold Nelson, a renowned leader of battlefield staff rides stated that the essence was, "To help individuals connect with the problems faced by yesterdays leaders in complex situations, and to evaluate the solutions those leaders applied."⁷¹ Edwin Bearss, Chief Historian Emeritus of the National Park Service said, "to underscore that although there have been revolutionary advances in technology, weaponry and communication, many aspects of success in battle – small unit leadership, terrain appreciation, courage, understanding the mission, flexibility – are as vital to today's combat arms as they were in 1861-65."⁷² Carol Reardon, Professor of History at Pennsylvania State University, felt that it was important for soldiers to, "understand the spatial dimensions of the battlefield, the time requirements it takes to cover that space, and the complications of weather, stress, etc." and that, "boots on the ground literally become a teaching tool."⁷³ Colonel Len Fullenkamp, director of the Army War College's Staff Ride program, used the specific example of Harpers Ferry, and how standing on Bolivar Heights you can see how "difficult to defend and equally difficult to attack is readily apparent in ways that are not obvious on two-dimensional maps" and that it was important to "combine the historical with the physical – the ground speaks to those who have the ability to hear what it is telling them."⁷⁴

There were also a variety of thoughts on the most important lessons to be learned specifically from a study of the Maryland Campaign. However, most agreed that because of the distances, it was an excellent opportunity to study an entire campaign and that Antietam in particular presented exceptional opportunities to discuss the human dimension of war. Other specific lessons mentioned were how leadership, or the lack of it, made the difference; how

military force can achieve strategic affects; opportunity to examine the interaction of military means with political ends; the importance of commander's intent; interior lines; the contrasting use of cavalry; the role of intelligence; and of course, terrain and its impact on the battle. It is interesting to note that when asked if they used the Staff Ride training method of students role playing battlefield commanders, all eleven respondents said that they did not like this format because of the difficulties in managing the timing. In addition, many agreed that a battlefield Staff Ride is a great opportunity to build unit morale and it provides participants a chance to connect with their military, and the nations heritage.

CONCLUSION

From the moment Robert E. Lee's army turned north in September of 1862 until today, members of this nation's military have fought, died, built, preserved, researched, remembered, walked, and trained on the historic landscape of Maryland Campaign. Soldiers and veterans have been the source of inspiration and leadership that have helped create the National Military Parks. They made it possible for today's military, and Americans of every walk of life, to learn great lessons of battle and be stirred on the very ground where men in blue and gray sacrificed so much to build a new nation.

WORD COUNT 10,830

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⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 591

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ OR, XIX, II, p. 601-2.

⁸ OR, XIX, II, p. 590-91.

⁹ OR, XIX, I, 144.

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³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Charles W. Snell and Sharon A. Brown, Antietam National Battlefield and National Cemetery, An Administrative History (Washington, D.C., 1986) 85.

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³⁶ Ibid., 86.

³⁷ Lee, 3.

³⁸ Snell and Brown, 91.

³⁹ Snell and Brown, 94.

⁴⁰ Numerous sources used for this compilation. For a full discussion of specific battlefield improvements see Snell and Brown.

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⁴³ Carl E. Vuono, "The Staff Ride: Training for Warfighting," The Army Historian, PB-20-88-1 (October 1988): 1-2.

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⁴⁵ Ibid., Forward.

⁴⁶ Carol Reardon, "From Antietam to the Argonne," The Antietam Campaign, ed. Gary Gallagher (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 291.

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⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Jay Luvaas, "The Staff Ride," U.S. Army War College Alumni Association Newsletter (Summer 1988): 12.

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⁵⁴ Reardon, 295.

⁵⁵ Arlington National Cemetery, "John Archer Lejeune Lieutenant General, United States Marine Corps," available from <<http://www.arlingtoncemetery.com/lejeune.htm>>; Internet; accessed 18 January 2003.

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⁵⁹ Luvass, "The Staff Ride," 16.

⁶⁰ Lee, Chapter 3, 2.

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⁶⁶ National Park Service, "Harpers Ferry National Historic Park," available from <<http://www.nps.gov/hafe/index.htm>>; Internet; accessed 2 March 2003.

⁶⁷ An Act to provide for the protection and preservation of the Antietam Battlefield in the State of Maryland, April 22, 1960 (74 Stat. 79).

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Vuono, 2.

⁷⁰ Robertson, 5.

⁷¹ Brigadier General (r) Harold Nelson, Maryland Campaign Staff Ride – Leader Questionnaire, Survey, Cited with permission of General Nelson.

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⁷³ Carol Reardon, Maryland Campaign Staff Ride – Leader Questionnaire, Survey, Cited with permission of Ms. Reardon.

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